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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 15-3255 
________________ 
 
JOAN MATTSON;  
ERIC MATTSON, individually and as a class representative on behalf  
of others similarly situated, 
 
         Appellants 
  
v. 
  
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE CO., d/b/a Aetna, Inc.;  
THE RAWLINGS COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a The Rawlings Group;  
S. N.J. REGIONAL EMPLOYEE BENEFIT FUND;  
COOPER UNIVERSITY HEALTHCARE, d/b/a Cooper Hospital/University  
Medical Center, d/b/a Cooper University Physicians, d/b/a Cooper University Hospital; 
JOHN DOES INDIVIDUALS AND BUSINESSES 1-20 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-14-cv-06809) 
District Judge: Honorable Joseph E. Irenas 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 13, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed June 23, 2016) 
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________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Eric Mattson suffered severe injuries in a car accident in 2012. At the time, he was 
his mother Joan Mattson’s dependent in a health benefits plan offered through the 
Southern New Jersey Regional Employee Benefit Fund (the “Fund”). After submitting 
hospital bills to the plan, the Mattsons received what they allege are improper requests 
for payments. These included two letters from a debt collector for the Fund. One said that 
Mr. Mattson would need to contribute to the plan from any recovery he got for the 
accident from any other party. Another said that there was a “claim/lien for medical 
benefits paid on behalf of [Mr. Mattson].” Joint Appendix (“JA”) 4 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Based on these communications, the Mattsons sued the Fund under the 
New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“CRA”). The District Court concluded that the allegations, 
taken as true, nonetheless failed to state a claim under the CRA. We agree and therefore 
affirm.1 
 The CRA provides a cause of relief for  
[a]ny person who has been deprived of any substantive due process or equal 
protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or 
laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Mattsons pursued various claims in the District Court, but 
the CRA claim against the Fund is the only one presented to us on appeal.  
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immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, or whose 
exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities 
has been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, 
intimidation or coercion by a person acting under color of law . . . . 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2(c). Per the plain text of this statute, deprivations of certain rights 
protected by state law provide a cause of action under the CRA. The Mattsons argue that 
the Fund violated two state laws—the New Jersey Collateral Source Statute (“NJCSS”) 
and the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (“AICRA”)2—and that these 
violations are actionable under the CRA. Specifically, they argue that the Fund, in 
violation of both laws, pursued a so-called “subrogation” claim against Mr. Mattson by 
asking him for reimbursement. 
 However, not all violations of state law cause CRA liability. Like 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, the CRA “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but rather a vehicle by which 
[other] rights . . . may be vindicated.” Tumpson v. Farina, 95 A.3d 210, 224 (N.J. 2014). 
As such, the New Jersey Supreme Court looks to § 1983 case law to determine the types 
of violations that are actionable under the CRA. Id. at 225. As relevant here, a plaintiff 
seeking to use a statutory violation as a basis for CRA liability must “show that . . .  [the 
legislature] intended the statute to benefit the plaintiff.” Id. at 224 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The District Court, without concluding whether the Fund violated the 
NJCSS or the AICRA, determined that neither statute was designed to protect plaintiffs 
                                              
2 The District Court concluded that it would not be possible for the Fund to have violated 
both statutes because the NJCSS does not apply when an insured party seeks recovery 
under the AICRA. See JA 13–14. However, because neither statute helps the Mattsons 
bring a CRA claim, we need not resolve this issue.  
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like the Mattsons from subrogation. We agree and, like the District Court, conclude that 
this is fatal to their CRA claim. 
 The first statute, the NJCSS, applies to a host of personal injury claims and 
provides that, in the event a plaintiff recovers an insurance payout, it  
shall be disclosed to the court and the amount thereof which duplicates any 
benefit contained in [a court] award shall be deducted from [the] award . . . 
less any premium paid to an insurer directly by the plaintiff or by any 
member of the plaintiff’s family on behalf of the plaintiff for the policy 
period during which the benefits are payable. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-97. Essentially, the statute prevents plaintiffs from double 
recovering—first through insurance and later through a personal injury verdict. Because 
civil verdicts are lessened by the amount of insurance recoveries, insurance providers are 
prevented from seeking subrogation in personal injury cases governed by the NJCSS. 
Perreira v. Rediger, 778 A.2d 429, 431 (N.J. 2001).  
 However, the NJCSS is not meant to benefit the Mattsons. Indeed, it lessens the 
amount of damages they can receive by disallowing a double recovery. The statute (and 
its bar on subrogation) is meant to benefit liability insurance carriers by reducing their 
exposure in personal injury suits. See id. (noting that the purpose of the statute is to 
“allocate . . . benefit[s]” to liability carriers). 
 Meanwhile, the AICRA details when and how an insurer can recover the benefits 
it paid out to insured parties. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 39:6A-9.1. The Mattsons say that this 
statute allows for subrogation but argue that the Fund pursued it the wrong way. We need 
not resolve this contention, as it is clear that the AICRA, like the NJCSS, is not designed 
to benefit plaintiffs such as the Mattsons. Its “legislative intent . . . was to . . . reduc[e] the 
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cost of insurance for automobile owners and allow[] automobile insurers to recover 
[benefits] through reimbursement.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Licensed Beverage 
Ins. Exch., 679 A.2d 620, 624 (N.J. 1996). As the District Court correctly observed, the 
Mattsons do indeed benefit from lower insurance costs. Nonetheless, “this benefit does 
not flow from [their] asserted right to be free from subrogation, but from a right conferred 
on [their] automobile insurer.” JA 19–20. 
*     *     *     *     * 
 The Mattsons claim that the Fund violated two statutes and seek to use those 
violations to anchor a CRA claim. However, neither statute is designed to benefit 
personal injury victims by freeing them from subrogation claims. As a result, even if the 
Fund violated the statutes, those violations would not create liability under the CRA. We 
therefore affirm.   
